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Abstract
We conduct an experimental analysis of a best-of-three contest. Intermediate prizes lead to
higher efforts, while increasing the role of luck (as opposed to effort) leads to lower efforts. Both
intermediate prizes and luck reduce the probability of contest ending in two rounds. The patterns
of players’ efforts and the probability that a contest ends in two rounds are consistent with
‘strategic momentum’, i.e., momentum generated due to strategic incentives inherent in the
contest. We do not find evidence for ‘psychological momentum’, i.e., momentum which emerges
when winning affects players’ confidence. Similar to previous studies of contests, we find
significantly higher efforts than predicted and strong heterogeneity in effort between subjects.
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1. Introduction
Many contests feature a best-of-N structure in which players compete over a sequence of
rounds and the first player to win a majority of the rounds wins the contest. The sequential nature
of the contest leads to several interesting predictions about the pattern of effort exerted by
players during the various rounds. These effort choices, in turn, imply predictions about the
pattern of outcomes. Examples of such contests include patent races (Fudenberg et al., 1983),
presidential nomination campaigns (Klumpp and Polborn, 2006) and sport competitions
(Szymanski, 2003). Patent races, for instance, are characterized by a dynamic multi stage setting
where the first firm to win the race is awarded patent protection. They have dynamic uncertainty
because the “incentive to invest in R&D may change as the race unfolds, according to the
position of a firm in the race relative to its competitors and relative to the end of the race” (Zizzo,
2002, pg. 878); as well as technological uncertainty because the firm making the most
investment may not always win the patent. We examine a best-of-N contest that encapsulates
both dynamic and technological uncertainty and analyze how inclusion of intermediate prizes
and varying level of uncertainty affects behavior. Our design also enables us to separate the
behavioral explanations of various choices from the strategic incentives inherent in the contest.
Empirical evidence on patent races is inconclusive (Zizzo, 2002), and much of the extant
empirical literature focuses on sports contests (Szymanski, 2003). Because it is difficult to
measure the actual effort expended by players in sports contests, almost all these studies focus
solely on whether the pattern of outcomes is consistent with theoretical predictions (baseball:
Mosteller 1952; tennis: Jackson 1993, Malueg and Yates 2010; golf: McFall et al. 2009;
baseball, basketball, and hockey: Ferrall and Smith, 1999). However, this methodology provides
only an indirect measure of effort. Laboratory data is untainted by various confounding factors
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(such as players’ abilities and skill) that afflict the field data, and therefore allows a direct test of
contest incentives. In this paper, we use laboratory experiments to obtain empirical evidence on
the pattern of effort and outcomes in the simplest possible best-of-N contest, a best-of-three
contest.
In a best-of-three contest between two ex-ante symmetric players, the first player to win
two rounds is the contest winner. We assume that in each round the winner is determined
probabilistically, and the probability of winning a round is a function of the players’ effort as
well as luck. Economic theory predicts that players will exert equal effort in the first round and
in the third round (if one occurs). In the second round, the relative efforts are determined by the
parameters of the contest. In our baseline treatment, the winner of the first round has a higher
effective value associated with winning the second round, and hence will exert more effort.
Translating effort into outcomes implies that both players are equally likely to win the first
round. The winner of the first round is more likely to win the second round; but if the contest
goes to the third round, then both players are once again are equally likely to win. Thus, the
outcome of the first round has an asymmetric effect on the second round efforts by ex-ante
symmetric players, and equilibrium play explains the emergence of a ‘hot hand’ (winning streak
that occurs more often than predicted by chance). We say that the winner of the first round
exhibits ‘strategic momentum’ in the second round to reinforce the idea that this increase in the
probability of winning is a consequence of the contest incentive structure.
In addition to strategic momentum, players in a best-of-three contest may also exhibit
‘psychological momentum.’ Folk psychology suggests numerous (and often contradictory) ways
in which relative position in the contest can affect performance. While there is no single
definition of psychological momentum, it is often based on the maxim ‘success breeds success,’
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i.e., winning a round affects players’ confidence and makes them more likely to win the next
round (Vallerand et al., 1988; Baker et al., 1994a, 1994b; Kerick et al., 2000; Dorsey-Palmeteer
and Smith, 2004).
Our experimental design exploits situations in which strategic and psychological
momentum give rise to different effort choices and outcomes. Our first piece of evidence to
distinguish between the two momentums lies in the structure of the best-of-three contest itself.
As mentioned earlier, in our baseline treatment the effort choices in the second round exhibit
strategic momentum, but in the third round players are symmetric and so there is no strategic
momentum: the optimal strategy for both players is to exert equal effort. However, if we observe
that the winner of the second round is more likely to win the third round, then this is evidence in
support of psychological momentum. To obtain additional validation, we employ a treatment
with parameters such that there is no strategic momentum in any round. In this case, if we
observe that the winner of the first round is more likely to win the second round, then again this
is evidence in support of psychological momentum.
Our experimental design also encompasses comparative statics for two treatment
variables. The first variable is an intermediate prize for winning an individual round. Theory
predicts that intermediate prizes leads to an increase in effort, and a decrease in the probability of
contest ending in two rounds. The second treatment variable is the degree to which luck rather
than effort determines the winner of a round. Theory predicts that an increase in the role of luck
leads to a decrease in effort and a decrease in the probability of contest ending in two rounds.
Existing experimental studies of contests investigate a diverse array of issues, such as
entry costs, player asymmetry, effect of carryover, risk aversion, multiple prizes, etc (e.g.,
Millner and Pratt, 1989, 1991; Potters et al., 1998; Davis and Reilly, 1998; Anderson and
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Stafford, 2003; Schmitt et al., 2004; Fonseca, 2009; Anderson and Freeborn, 2010; Sheremeta
and Zhang, 2010; Price and Sheremeta, 2011; Cason et al., 2012; Kimbrough and Sheremeta,
2012; Savikhin and Sheremeta, 2012). For a comprehensive review of the experimental literature
on contests see Dechenaux et al. (2012). However, most experimental studies consider only
single round contests. Studies on multiple round contests are few and relatively recent, and often
consider an elimination contest rather than best-of-N structure. Parco et al. (2005) and Amaldoss
and Rapoport (2009) consider an elimination setting wherein the players compete within their
own groups by expending efforts, and the winner of each group proceeds to the second round. In
the second round, players compete with one another to win a prize by expending additional
efforts subject to a budget constraint. Sheremeta (2010a, 2010b) examines behavior in multiround elimination contests without budget constraints. Deck and Sheremeta (2012) examine a
multi-round contest in which players have asymmetric objectives. To the best of our knowledge,
there are only three experimental studies on best-of-N contests. Zizzo (2002) examines the
aggressiveness of players in a multi-round contest that simulates a patent race (the first player to
win 10 rounds wins the contest). Unlike our design, however, subjects in Zizzo (2002) are budget
constrained. This confounds the role of momentum with the task of determining the optimal
allocation of resources across different rounds. Irfanoglu et al. (2013) focus mainly on the
difference between behavior in sequential and simultaneous best-of-three contests. Finally, Mago
and Sheremeta (2012) examine behavior in a multi-battle contest with deterministic all-pay
contest success function, that is, player who exerts higher effort wins the battle with certainty.
The primary focus of our paper is to examine the patterns of effort and outcomes in a
contest with the best-of-three structure to distinguish between strategic and psychological
momentum. Our results are consistent with strategic momentum, and we do not find any
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evidence for psychological momentum. Our results, therefore, supplement a recent field study by
Malueg and Yates (2010), who also document evidence of strategic momentum but not
psychological momentum in tennis matches between equally skilled players. Malueg and Yates
only observe outcomes and must infer efforts. Our results verify that effort choices do indeed
lead to strategic momentum. Taken together with Malueg and Yates’ (2010) results, our findings
offer strong evidence that players recognize and respond to the varying incentives during the
course of a best-of-three contest.
We extend the theoretical literature on best-of-three contests by analyzing the impact of
intermediate prizes. We also contribute to the experimental literature by testing the Nash
equilibrium prediction and comparative statics with respect to both intermediate prizes and luck.
Almost without exception, existing experimental studies on contests provide evidence of effort
expenditure that is in excess of Nash equilibrium levels (for a review on the overbidding
phenomena see Sheremeta, 2013), but confirm the various models’ comparative statics
predictions. Our results are similarly consistent. We find strong support for our comparative
statics predictions, but we also find significantly higher efforts than predicted and strong
heterogeneity in effort between subjects. We discuss a number of possible explanations for these
findings.

2. Theoretical Model
Several papers analyze the theory of effort expenditure in a best-of-three contest. These
papers are differentiated by the way in which they model the competition that occurs in each
round. Konrad and Kovenock (2009) use an all-pay auction, Ferrall and Smith (1999) use a rankorder tournament, and Klumpp and Polborn (2006) use a Tullock contest.
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We extend Klumpp and Polborn’s analysis to allow for intermediate prizes. Two riskneutral and equally-skilled players i and j face each other in as many as three successive rounds.
The first player to win two rounds is the contest winner. In each round, players select efforts xi
and xj. The contest success function p(xi, xj) specifies the probability that player i wins the round
as a function of players’ efforts. Following Tullock (1980), we have
p(xi, xj) = xir/(xir + xjr).

(1)

The exponent r reflects how sensitive the probability of winning is to the players’ relative
expenditure and can be interpreted as the degree of `luck’ in the contest. As r decreases, luck
plays a more important role. As r approaches zero, the probability of winning is equivalent to a
random coin toss, regardless of the individual effort choices.1 Both players value winning the
contest at v, and there is an additional intermediate prize d for winning individual rounds.
To characterize the players’ effort choices, we apply backward induction. Let Vi(m,n) be
the expected payoff to player i when player i needs to win m more rounds to win the contest and
player j needs to win n more rounds. We start at the third and final round. The winner of the third
round receives the final prize v for winning the overall contest, and an intermediate prize d for
winning the third round. The loser of the third round receives 0. Therefore the expected payoff
for player i is
Vi(1,1) = p(v + d – xi) + (1 – p)(– xi) = p(v + d) – xi,

(2)

and the expected payoff for player j is
Vj(1,1) = (1 – p)(v + d – xj) + p(– xj) = (1 – p)(v + d) – xj.

(3)

This is equivalent to a standard single-round Tullock contest in which player i’s value of winning
is V = v + d and player j’s value of winning is W = v + d. The Nash equilibrium efforts are well
known and are given by
1

We assume that 0 < r ≤ 1 which ensures that a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists.
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xi* = rρrV/(1 + ρr)2 and xj* = rρrW/(1 + ρr)2,

(4)

where ρ = W/V is the ratio of players’ values. Note that the ratio of players’ efforts is equal to the
ratio of their values (Malueg and Yates, 2005). It therefore follows that in the third round of our
best-of-three contest, players exert equal effort because they have the same value for winning the
round. From (4), the third round Nash equilibrium efforts are
xi* = xj* = r(v + d)/4.

(5)

In terms of comparative statics, equilibrium effort increases as value of winning (including
intermediate prize d) increases, and as luck plays less of a role (r increases). The expected
payoffs for the players can be found by substituting (5) into (2) and (3).
Stepping backwards to analyze the second round, we can, without loss of generality,
assume that player i has won the first round. If player i wins the second round the contest
concludes; player i receives the final prize v for winning the overall contest and an intermediate
prize d for winning the second round while player j receives zero. If, however, player j wins the
second round the contest moves to the third round, and player i receives the third round expected
payoff Vi(1,1) while player j receives an intermediate prize d and the third round expected payoff
Vj(1,1). Therefore, the expected payoff for player i in the second round is
Vi(1,2) = p(v + d – xi) + (1 – p)(Vi(1,1) – xi) = Vi(1,1) + p(v + d – Vi(1,1)) – xi,

(6)

and the expected payoff for player j in the second round is
Vi(1,2) = (1 – p)(d + Vj(1,1) – xj) + p(– xj) = (1 – p)(Vj(1,1) + d) – xj.

(7)

This is equivalent to a standard single-round Tullock contest in which player i’s ‘effective’ value
of winning is V = v + d – Vi(1,1) and player j’s ‘effective’ value of winning is W = d + Vj(1,1).2
The Nash equilibrium efforts in the second round can be found by substituting these values into

2

Note that the value Vi(1,1) is the expected payoff in round 3 and does not depend on the effort xi in the current
round.
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(4). This yields a complicated expression for individual player efforts, but essential insight into
the second round behavior can be gleaned by examining the ratio of players’ efforts. We have
xj*/xi* = W/V = ((v + d)(1/2 – r/4) + d)/ ((v + d)(1/2 + r/4)).

(8)

This ratio may be greater than, equal to, or less than one, depending on the values of the
parameters. In particular, player i will exert more effort than player j if d < rv/(2-r), player i will
exert less effort than player j if d > rv/(2-r), and the players will exert equal effort if d = rv/(2-r).
It bears highlighting that in cases where player i exerts more effort than player j, we have
strategic momentum. This momentum emerges endogenously in round 2, because although
winning the overall contest has same value to both players, players may have different effective
values for winning the round.
Finally, consider the first round. If player i wins the first round, she receives the
intermediate prize d and the expected payoff Vi(1,2). If player i loses the first round, she receives
the expected payoff Vi(2,1). Therefore, the expected payoff for player i in the first round is
Vi(2,2) = p(d+Vi(1,2)-xi)+(1-p)(Vi(2,1)-xi) = Vi(2,1)+p(d+Vi(1,2)-Vi(2,1))-xi,

(9)

and the expected payoff for player j in the first round is
Vj(2,2) = (1-p)(d+Vj(2,1)-xj)+p(Vj(1,2)-xj) = Vj(1,2)+(1-p)(d+Vj(2,1)-Vj(1,2))-xi.

(10)

This is equivalent to a standard single round Tullock contest in which V = (d+Vi(1,2)-Vi(2,1)) and
W = (d+Vj(2,1)-Vj(1,2)). By symmetry, if player i has lost rather than won the first round,
Vi(2,1) = Vj(1,2) and Vj(2,1) = Vi(1,2),

(11)

so that V = W. Once again players have equal effective values for winning the round and so they
exert equal effort in the first round. Comparative statics regarding d and r remain the same as in
round 3. Note, however, that the effective value of winning the first round is lower than the
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effective value of winning the third round. Therefore, if the contest goes to the third round, both
players exert greater effort than in earlier rounds.
Player’s effort choices have an immediate consequence on the probability of the contest
ending in 2 or 3 rounds. If both players exert equal effort in every round, then the best-of-three
contest is equally likely to end in two as in three rounds. However, if in round 2 the first round
winner exerts greater effort than the first round loser, then the contest is more likely to end in 2
rounds. Furthermore, this likelihood is positively related to the difference between effort choices
of round 1 winner and round 1 loser. Since both players’ absolute effort increases in prize value,
it follows that the relative difference between their effort choices, and consequently the
likelihood of early termination, will be lower with the institution of intermediate prizes.
Our theoretical model illustrates how strategic momentum results from equilibrium play.
However, laboratory experiments feature human subjects who may also experience
psychological momentum. Psychological literature suggests that psychological momentum can
be bi-directional (e.g., Vallerand et al., 1988; Kerick et al., 2000). This means that the
‘encouraged’ winner of a given round may experience positive psychological momentum and the
‘discouraged’ loser may experience negative psychological momentum. A simple way to
incorporate this idea into a best-of-three contest is to assume that psychological momentum leads
the winner of a given round to exert more effort in the next round than the loser of a given round.
Thus, psychological momentum may occur in both second and third round, regardless of the
underlying parameter values.
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3. Experimental Environment
3.1. Experimental Design and Hypotheses
Table 1 summarizes our experimental design and parameters. We employ three features:
“H” denotes a high value for r, “L” denotes a low value for r, and “I” denotes an intermediate
prize. In our baseline HI treatment, the value for r is high (r = 1) and there is an intermediate
prize for winning an individual round (d = 25 experimental francs). We include two control
treatments. First, to analyze the impact of intermediate prize we include the H treatment. In the H
treatment, there is no intermediate prize (d = 0), otherwise it is identical to the HI treatment.
Second, to analyze the impact of luck we consider an alternative value for r. In the LI treatment,
the value for r is low (r = 0.4), otherwise it is identical to the HI treatment. Our choice of
parameters also enables us to distinguish between strategic and psychological momentum. HI
and H treatments feature strategic momentum in the second round because d < rv/(2-r), so the
theory predicts that the winner of the first round will exert more effort in the second round than
the loser of the first round. In the LI treatment, d and r were chosen such that d = rv/(2-r), so the
theory predicts that both players exert equal effort in the second round and there is no strategic
momentum. There is no strategic momentum in round 3 for all treatments.
Table 1 presents the equilibrium efforts in each round, the expected payoffs, and the
probability of contest ending in two rounds for all three treatments. In all three treatments the
value of the final prize is v = 100 experimental francs. The theoretical predictions in Table 1
suggest a number of hypotheses. The first three concern comparative statics:3

3

These comparative statics are based on our experimental parameters. They match the differential comparative
statics predicted by the theory, with one exception: the effect of a marginal increase in luck on the round 2 effort by
the round 1 loser is ambiguous in theory.
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Hypothesis 1: Comparing HI versus H treatment, (a) intermediate prizes lead to higher
effort in all rounds by both players; (b) intermediate prizes reduce the probability of contest
ending in two rounds.
Hypothesis 2: Comparing HI versus LI treatment, (a) lower r (higher role for luck) leads
to lower effort in all rounds by both players; (b) lower r (higher role for luck) reduces the
probability of the contest ending in two rounds.
Hypothesis 3: In all treatments, effort in round 3 is higher than effort in rounds 1 and 2.
The next two hypotheses concern the features of strategic momentum:
Hypothesis 4: In HI and H treatments, (a) round 1 winner exerts more effort in round 2
than round 1 loser. In LI treatment, (b) both winner and loser of round 1 exert the same effort in
round 2.
Hypothesis 5: In all treatments, round 2 winner exerts the same effort in round 3 as
round 2 loser.
Note that evidence in favor of Hypothesis 4b and Hypothesis 5 provides evidence against
psychological momentum.

3.2. Experimental Procedures
A total of 108 subjects participated in nine sessions with 12 subjects per session. All
subjects were undergraduate students at Chapman University. Subjects participated in only one
session of this study, although some subjects had previously participated in other unrelated
economics experiments.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007). No communication between subjects was permitted and all choices and information were
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transmitted via computer terminals. At the beginning of each session, subjects received an initial
endowment of $15 to cover potential losses. Each experimental session proceeded in two parts: a
risk assessment part and a best-of-three contest part. Subjects were given instructions, available
in the Online Appendix, at the beginning of each part. The experimenter read the instructions
aloud, so the information contained therein is assumed to be common knowledge. Subjects then
completed an online quiz to verify their understanding of the instructions. The experiment started
only after all subjects had completed the quiz, and explanations were provided for any incorrect
answers. In the risk assessment part of the experiment, subjects made 15 choices in simple
lotteries, similar to Holt and Laury (2002). This method was used to elicit subjects’ risk
preferences.
In the contest part of the experiment, subjects participated in 20 periods of play in one of
the three treatments. In each period, subjects played a best-of-three contest with a randomly and
anonymously selected opponent. The experimental implementation of the contest mimicked the
theory described above, with effort variable xi referred to as the player’s ‘bid.’4 Subjects were
told the structure of the best-of-three contest and were given detailed instructions on how their
bid and their opponent’s bid were combined in the relevant contest success function to determine
the probability of winning a given round. Subjects were also informed that by increasing their
bids, they would increase their chance of winning the round and that, regardless of who wins the
round, all subjects would have to pay their bids (money spent on bidding was subtracted from the
4

In our experiment “effort” is an abstract concept, and is represented by a “bid.” This notion is consistent with
previous contest literature where effort is used to describe any allocation decision such as research and development
investment choice (Zizzo, 2002), campaign expenditures (Klumpp and Polborn, 2006), bidding behavior
(Sheremeta, 2011). An alternative design choice would be to use “real effort” such as solving mazes (Freeman and
Gelber, 2010), optimization problems (van Dijk et al., 2001), or adding numbers (Cason et al., 2010). However, real
effort tasks involve fatigue, boredom, excitement and other affectations which are not modeled by the theory (van
Dijk et al., 2001). Our primary motivation is to disentangle the behavioral explanations of various effort choices
from the strategic incentives inherent in the contest. Since psychological momentum measures intrinsic motivations
at play, inclusion of other uncontrolled-for social dimensions would dilute the result and weaken the exposition. By
focusing on abstract choices, we are able to avoid any framing issues.
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initial endowment of $15 that was given to the subjects to cover potential losses). In each round
of the contest, subjects made their bids (any number of francs between 0 and 100, including 0.1
decimal points).5 After subjects submitted their bids, the computer chose the winner of that round
by implementing a lottery with probabilities defined by the contest success function and the
players’ bids. At the end of each round, computer displayed own bid, opponent’s bid, and the
result of the lottery draw. A period lasted either two or three rounds. The period ended when one
of the players won two rounds ("best of three"). At the end of each period subjects were
randomly re-matched with a new opponent.
We took several steps to help subjects understand the role of the contest success function
in determining the contest outcome. We provided subjects with a probability table which showed
the chance of winning a round based on their own bid and the other subject’s bid. In the table a
subject could find, for example, that if his bid is 50 francs while the other participant’s bid is 30
francs then his chance of winning the round is 0.63 in the LI treatment (0.55 in the H and HI
treatments). To assist subjects with more precise probability calculations, we also provided them
with Excel calculators. Subjects could use these calculators at any point of time to find their
chance of winning a round for any combination of bids.
At the end of the experiment, 2 out of 20 periods in the contest part of the experiment
were randomly selected for payment.6 The sum of the earnings for these 2 periods was

5

Our decision not to constrain individual bidding (i.e., 100 francs is substantially higher than the highest possible
equilibrium bid of 31.3, see Table 1) was driven by the fact that artificial budget constraint may confound the role of
momentum with the task of determining the optimal allocation of constrained resources across different rounds.
Assuming non-limiting budget provides a clean framework to analyze strategic versus psychological momentum.
Moreover, the majority of theoretical models (including the one used in the current study) assume no budget
constraints, arguing that such constraints are unlikely to be binding in the world of competitive capital markets
where it is relatively easy to borrow money (D’Avolio, 2002). Finally, enforcing even non-binding budget
constraints on subjects may unexpectedly affect subjects’ behavior (Sheremeta, 2011). Therefore, to be consistent
with the theoretical model and to avoid potential unintended behavioral consequences, we decided not to restrict
subjects’ strategy space.
6
2 periods were selected at random to control for intra-experimental income effects (McKee, 1989).
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exchanged at rate of 25 experimental francs = US $1. Subjects were also paid for 1 out of the 15
decisions made in the risk assessment part of the experiment. On average, subjects earned $20
each, which was paid anonymously and in cash. The experimental sessions lasted about 90
minutes.

4. Results
4.1. Comparative Statics Results
Table 2 summarizes the average effort in each round, total effort and payoffs, and the
likelihood of contest ending in two rounds. Figure 1 displays the time series of average total
effort over all 20 periods. Consistent with other experimental studies of contests we find
persistent and significant over-dissipation in all three treatments. In Section 4.3, we explore
possible reasons for this over-dissipation. It is important to note that although subjects expend
significantly more effort than predicted, aggregate effort patterns remain sensitive to the Nash
prediction. Comparing across treatments, total effort in all three treatments is in qualitative
agreement with the equilibrium predictions (average total effort is 76.3 in HI, 60.8 in H and 58.2
in LI).
Table 3 reports the estimation results of different panel models where individual subjects
represent the random effects, and the standard errors are clustered at the session level. The
dependent variable in specifications (1) and (2) is the subject’s total effort in the three rounds and
the independent variables are a period trend and a treatment HI dummy-variable. The estimation
results indicate that total effort expended in the HI treatment is significantly higher than the
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effort expended in the H treatment (p-value < 0.01) and the LI treatment (p-value < 0.01).7 This
finding lends strong empirical support for Hypothesis 1a and 2a. The fact that effort in the HI
treatment is significantly greater than effort in the LI treatment, suggests that subjects understand
that luck plays less of a role in the HI treatment and they increase their efforts accordingly.
Similarly, intermediate prizes for individual round wins also elicit higher effort. Nevertheless,
while the theory accurately predicts the directional impact of luck and intermediate prizes, the
quantitative impact is not as pronounced. Comparing HI and H treatment, total effort is predicted
to be 37% lower in the H treatment but is actually only 20% lower. The comparison for HI and
LI treatment yields even bigger differences. Effort in the LI treatment is predicted to be 58%
lower than the HI treatment, but the decrease in effort is less than half of that (24%).
Result 1: Intermediate prizes lead to significantly higher effort by both players (HI
versus H) while lower r (higher role of luck) leads to significantly lower effort (HI versus LI).
Theory also predicts that intermediate prizes and exponent r influence the probability of
contest ending in two rounds. In qualitative agreement with the equilibrium predictions, data
indicates that the probability of contest ending in round 2 decreases with intermediate prizes
(0.61 in H versus 0.58 in HI) and with lower r (0.58 in HI versus 0.51 in LI). Table 3
(specifications 3 and 4) reports the estimation of random-effect probit models, where the
dependent variable is the indicator of contest ending in 2 rounds and the independent variables
are a period trend and a treatment HI dummy-variable. The estimation results indicate that the
probability of contest ending in 2 rounds is significantly different when comparing HI and LI
treatment (p-value = 0.02), but not when comparing H and HI treatment (p-value = 0.23). The
latter result is because the observed probability of contest ending in 2 rounds is significantly
7

These results hold even when we focus only on the last 10 periods when subjects have gained sufficient
experience. Total effort in HI treatment is significantly greater than effort in H treatment (p-value < 0.01) and in LI
treatment (p-value = 0.03). The detailed estimation results are available from the authors upon request.

16

lower than predicted in the H treatment.8 This finding lends partial empirical support to
Hypothesis 1b and 2b.
Result 2: The probability of contest ending in two rounds is significantly lower with
lower r (HI versus LI), but is not significantly lower with intermediate prizes (HI versus H).
Finally, we compare effort in round 3 with effort levels in rounds 1 and 2. Theoretical
analysis suggests that in all treatments players should exert the highest effort in round 3. Table 4
reports the estimation results of random-effect models, where the dependent variable is either
effort3-effort1 (specifications 1, 2 and 3) or effort3-effort2 (specifications 4, 5 and 6). We control
for time trend by including period as an independent variable and we cluster standard errors at
the session level. All specifications indicate that effort in round 3 is significantly higher than
effort in rounds 1 and 2 (p-value on the constant term is less than 0.01 in all specifications), and
thus provide support for Hypothesis 3.
Result 3: Effort in round 3 is significantly higher than effort in rounds 1 and 2.

4.2. Strategic versus Psychological Momentum
Table 2 and Figures 2, 3 and 4 display the average effort choices by players in each of the
three rounds. Theory predicts that in the HI and H treatments, winner of round 1 should have
strategic momentum in round 2 (Hypothesis 4). We find support for this in the data. Effort in
round 2 by the winner of round 1 exceeds that of the loser (HI: 28.5 versus 23.5 and H: 37.0
versus 28.1). Table 5 reports the estimation results of random-effect models, where the
dependent variable is effort2 (specifications 1, 2 and 3) and the independent variables are a

8

The observed probability of the contest ending in 2 rounds in HI and LI treatment is not significantly different
from prediction (observed versus predicted - HI: 0.58 versus 0.63, p-value = 0.51; LI: 0.51 versus 0.5. p-value =
0.59); but is significantly lower than predicted in the H treatment (0.61 versus 0.75, p-value < 0.01). The detailed
estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
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period trend and a win1 dummy-variable. Specifications (1) and (2) indicate that, in treatments H
and HI, the winner of round 1 (win1) exerts significantly higher effort in round 2 than the loser.
Accordingly, the likelihood that round 1 winner wins the overall contest remains greater than 50
percent in both treatments (HI: 58 percent and H: 61 percent). Of course, it is possible that part
or all of this momentum in round 2 of the HI and H treatments is due to psychological
momentum. The second round of the LI treatment offers a more discriminating test. Here, theory
predicts no strategic momentum in round 2, i.e., the outcome of round 1 does not influence either
player’s effort choices in round 2. However, if psychological momentum is present then the
round 1 winner should expend higher effort than the loser. Our data indicates that effort chosen
by round 1 winner in round 2 is not different from that chosen by round 1 loser (LI: 24.4 versus
23.3; p-value on win1 is 0.20 in Specification (3) in Table 5). This implies that the round 1
winner is no more likely to win round 2. Our finding that the probability of contest ending in
round 2 remains close to prediction (51 percent versus 50 percent) is consistent with this result,
suggesting no psychological momentum in round 2 of the LI treatment.9
Result 4: In HI and H treatments, effort in round 2 by round 1 winner is significantly
higher than effort by round 1 loser, so the contest is more likely to end in two rounds. (Evidence
supporting strategic momentum). In LI treatment, effort in round 2 by round 1 winner is not
significantly different from the effort by round 1 loser, so the contest is equally likely to end in
two rounds as in three. (Evidence against physiological momentum).
Turning to round 3, theory predicts there should not be any strategic momentum. Both
players should exert the same effort in round 3 (Hypothesis 5). However, there may be

9

These results are further substantiated by probit models that include subject random effects, session fixed effects
and a time trend. We find that in HI and H treatments, the likelihood of winning round 2 is higher for round 1
winner (p-value < 0.01); but in case of LI treatment, round 1 winner is no more likely to win round 2 than round 1
loser (p-value = 0.45). The detailed estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
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psychological momentum, as success or failure in the second round may affect players in the
third round. Using panel data analysis with subject specific random effects and robust standard
errors, we find no difference in the round 3 effort chosen by the winner of round 2 compared to
the loser of round 2 (H: 33.2 versus 31.7; HI: 40.6 versus 38.1; LI: 25.3 versus 24.3).
Specifications (4)-(6) in Table 5 indicate that in treatments H, HI and LI, the effort in round 3 by
the winner of round 2 (win2) is not significantly different from the effort by the loser of round 2.
Result 5: In all treatments, effort in round 3 by round 2 winner is not significantly
different than effort by round 2 loser. (Evidence against psychological momentum).
Taken together, Results 4 and 5, allow us to convincingly state that the momentum in the
second round of the HI and H treatments, which results in a greater likelihood of the contest
ending in two rounds, is a result of strategic considerations and not psychological impetus.
As a final note, in our experimental setting it is also possible for psychological
momentum to exist across periods. This would imply that a player who won the contest in period
t is more likely to exert higher effort in round 1 of period t +1. We tried to control for this
spillover by randomly selecting only 2 out 20 periods for payment. Moreover, based on the
estimation of a random-effect model with standard errors clustered at session level and subjectlevel random effects, we do not find any significant relation between winning in period t and
effort in round 1 of period t+1 (p-value = 0.34), suggesting no psychological momentum across
periods.10

4.3. Over-dissipation
At the beginning of Section 4.1, we noted a striking feature of the data: in all three
treatments, subjects over-expend effort relative to the risk-neutral Nash predictions. As is evident
10

The detailed estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
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from Table 2 and Figure 1, the magnitude of this difference is large and persistent over time. In
the H and LI treatments, average total effort is around twice the equilibrium prediction (H: 60.8
versus 32; LI: 58.2 versus 21.3), and in the HI treatment average total effort is about 50 percent
larger (76.3 versus 50.5).11 Such over-dissipation is not uncommon in experimental literature on
contests. For a review of this phenomena and various explanations suggested in the literature see
Sheremeta (2013). One such explanation is inexperience. For example, Davis and Reilly (1998)
show that overbidding decreases but does not disappear with time. Regressions reported in
Tables 3 and 5 show that the inverse of a period trend is positive and significant, which suggests
that individual learning is taking place, and that with repetition subjects expend lower efforts.12
This is also evident in Figures 1-4. Nevertheless, the difference between predicted and observed
effort level remains significant even in the last 5 periods (p-value < 0.01). As a result of this
over-dissipation, the observed payoffs in all three treatments are significantly lower than
expected (p-value < 0.01).
Result 6: There is significant aggregate over-dissipation in all treatments. The level of
over-dissipation decreases over time, but remains positive and significant.
Furthermore, it is important to note that while over-dissipation does not distort the
qualitative comparative statics results (Results 1 and 2), it does influence the quantitative
analysis. For example, when testing Hypotheses 1 and 2, we observed that the effort does not fall
11

To find empirical support for these conclusions we estimated a simple panel regression separately for each
treatment over all 20 periods. The random effects model included total effort as the dependent variable and a
constant and a time trend as the independent variables. The model included random efforts error structure
(individual subjects) and the standard errors were clustered at the session level. A standard Wald test, conducted on
the estimates of the model, finds that for all treatments the constant coefficients are significantly higher than the
predicted theoretical values (p-value < 0.01). The detailed estimation results are available from the authors upon
request.
12
It is important to emphasize that total effort is more stable in the LI treatment than in the HI or H treatments.
When regressing total effort on a constant and a time trend, we find that the time trend is significant in the HI and H
treatments (p-value<0.01), but it is not significant in the LI treatment (p-value = 0.18). This result makes intuitive
sense. Because there is no strategic momentum in the LI treatment, it is easier for subjects to make their bids in
rounds 2 and 3. In the HI and H treatments, on the other hand, incentives inherent in the strategic momentum render
bidding to be more complicated and thus it took more time for the behavior to stabilize.
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in proportion to the predicted level. Also, contrary to the prediction of a substantial drop in effort
by round 1 loser, we find that both round 1 winner and loser increase their effort in round 2. This
over-dissipation in round 2 efforts by both players can explain why equilibrium over-predicts the
probability of the contest ending in two rounds (HI: 63 versus 58 percent and H: 75 versus 61
percent).
There are a number of other explanations for over-dissipation in contests. One common
explanation is that subjects are likely to make mistakes. Sheremeta (2011) shows how quantal
response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995), which accounts for individual errors, can
explain some of the over-dissipation observed in lottery contests. Another explanation for overdissipation is based on the evolutionary argument (Leininger, 2003; Hehenkamp et al., 2004;
Riechmann, 2007; Mago et al., 2012). Evolutionary behavior postulates that players aim to beat
each other, i.e., the tenet of ‘rational payoff maximization’ is replaced by ‘relative payoff
maximization.’ Theoretically, for a two-player single-round Tullock contest, the effort in an
evolutionary stable equilibrium is twice the effort in the Nash equilibrium (Hehenkamp et al.,
2004).13 Empirically, Mago et al. (2012) provide evidence for such behavior.
Another oft-cited explanation is based on judgmental biases and misperception of
probabilities (Baharad and Nitzan, 2008). Many studies on individual behavior provide evidence
that subjects misperceive probabilities in a systematic way – they assign over-weight to lower
probability of winning and under-weight to higher probability of winning (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992). This misperception and the resulting errors are explored by Parco et al. (2005)
and Amaldoss and Rapoport (2009) as an explanation for observed deviations from Nash
equilibrium play in lottery contests. Finally, recent experiments have found evidence that
13

This quest to seek higher (expected) payoff than others is consistent with ‘spite effect’ contended by Hamilton
(1970) or ‘survival of the fittest’ contended by Alchian (1950). Vriend (2000) and Reichmann (2006) show that
learning by imitation of successful others is also equivalent to maximizing relative payoffs.
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subjects have a non-monetary utility of winning a Tullock contest, and this can partially explain
overdissipation of effort (Parco et al., 2005; Sheremeta, 2010b).14
All the above arguments can at least partially explain the over-dissipation documented in
Result 6. However, we also provide an additional explanation for over-dissipation that is specific
to our experiment: the sunk costs hypothesis. In an economic analysis of best-of-three contests,
effort expenditures in earlier rounds are sunk costs. Therefore, rational subjects should not let
these previous expenditures affect their effort choices in current rounds. Evidence from various
behavioral studies, however, suggests sunk costs can affect behavior (Arkes and Blumer, 1985;
Friedman et al. 2010).15 In our experiment, subjects who get to the third round have already
expended some positive effort in the previous two rounds. If the sunk costs hypothesis is true,
subjects who expend more effort in rounds 1 and 2 are also more likely to expend higher effort in
the final decisive round. Based on a simple random effect regression, we find that there is a
positive and significant relation between effort in round 3 and total effort in the previous two
rounds. This holds true irrespective of whether we use aggregate or treatment-specific data.
Therefore, the sunk costs hypothesis may partially account for over-dissipation in our
experiment.

4.5. Heterogeneous Behavior
Contrary to a unique pure-strategy Nash prediction, there is substantial variation in effort
choices across subjects. In the HI treatment, total effort is predicted to be 50.5, but instead the
14

Sheremeta (2010b) provides evidence for such non-monetary utility, by documenting that about 50% of subjects
are willing to exert positive effort (thereby incurring monetary costs) in order to be the winner of a contest with the
prize value of 0. Parco et al. (2005) conjecture that utility of winning is increasing in the size of the prize. This
implies that intermediate prizes will render effort in HI treatment to be higher than effort in H treatment. This is
borne by our comparative statics results (Result 1).
15
In the literature, the mechanism underlying this ‘irrational escalation of commitment’ is attributed to cognitive
dissonance (Festinger, 1957), self-justification (Aronson, 1968) and prospect theory or loss aversion (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1979).
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individual average total effort choices range from 24.5 to 131.3, with the standard deviation of
21.2. In the H treatment, instead of predicted 32.0, the individual effort choices range from 11.3
to 127.9, with the standard deviation of 24.4. Finally, in the LI treatment, instead of predicted
21.3, the individual effort choices range from 26.5 to 102.4, with the standard deviation of 17.6.
Result 7: There is strong heterogeneity in effort between subjects.
A common explanation is that individual efforts are heterogeneous because subjects who
make these effort choices have heterogeneous preferences (Sheremeta, 2013). We postulate that,
to some extent, heterogeneity of efforts in our experiment can be explained by heterogeneity of
individual risk preferences.16 Recall that in the first part of our experiment, subjects participated
in a simple lottery choice experiment that measured risk aversion. The experiment contained 15
lottery choices – subjects were asked to state whether they preferred safe option A or risky
option B. Option A yielded $1 payoff with certainty, while option B yielded a payoff of either $3
or $0. The probability of receiving $3 or $0 varied across all 15 lotteries.17 These probabilities
were structured such that the higher number of safe options corresponds to higher risk aversion.
Our subject pool is typical in the sense that there is significant heterogeneity of risk preferences
among subjects and a majority of subjects show a tendency towards risk-averse behavior (HI: 72
percent, H: 77.9 percent; LI: 76.2 percent).
Another factor that can explain the observed heterogeneity of efforts in contests is
gender. It is well documented that women tend to overbid in auctions (Ham and Kagel, 2006;

16

In the theoretical literature, the effect of risk aversion on effort in contests is ambiguous and depends on the
assumptions of the model. Hillman and Katz (1984) showed that risk-averse players should expend lower effort than
risk-neutral players, and risk-seeking players should exert higher effort. Treich (2009) established that risk aversion
always reduces effort if risk-averse players are also ‘prudent’. Nitzan (1991) showed that if agents are risk-averse,
the degree of under-dissipation is inversely related to the degree of risk aversion. Konrad and Schlesinger (1997), on
the other hand, showed that "it is possible for the contest with risk-averse players to dissipate more of the rents than
the same contest with risk-neutral players" (Konrad and Schlesinger, 1997, p. 1677).
17
The first lottery offered a 0% chance of winning $3 and a 100% chance of winning $0, while the last lottery
offered a 70% chance of winning $3 and a 30% chance of winning $0.
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Charness and Levin, 2009; Chen et al., 2012). Price and Sheremeta (2012) find that, similarly to
auction studies, women tend to make higher efforts (overbid) in contests. At the end of our
experiment, we conducted a short demographic survey which contained gender information.
According to the survey, there are about 40% of men and 60% of women in our sample.
We test for the effect of risk-aversion and gender on subjects’ effort choices. Table 6
reports the estimation results of panel models where individual subjects represent the random
effects, and the standard errors are clustered at the session level. The dependent variable in all
specifications is the subject’s total effort in the three rounds and the independent variables are a
dummy-variable for woman, a number of safe choices, a period trend and a constant. The
estimation results in specifications (1) and (2) indicate that women make significantly higher
efforts in the H and HI treatments. This finding is consistent with the findings of Price and
Sheremeta (2012). Specifications (1) and (2) also show a significant negative correlation
between the total effort and the number of safe choices, thereby indicating that risk-averse
subjects expend less effort.18 This observation is consistent with the findings of other contest
experiments where r = 1 (Millner and Pratt, 1991; Anderson and Freeborn, 2009; Sheremeta,
2011). Together, these findings suggest that gender and differences in risk preferences can
partially explain heterogeneous behavior of subjects in contests.19

18

It is interesting to note that neither gender nor risk preference are correlated with the total effort in the LI
treatment. This can be explained by the fact that luck plays a relatively large role in the LI treatment, which
diminishes the impact of risk preferences on total effort.
19
We re-estimated the regressions reported in Table 3, controlling for gender and risk preferences, and found very
similar treatment effects. When using the combined data for treatments HI and H (specification 1 in Table 3), gender
and risk preferences are significantly correlated with total effort at the 0.01 level, but this does not hold true when
we use the combined data for treatments HI and LI (specification 2). The probability of the contest ending in 2
rounds is also not affected by gender or risk preferences (specifications 3 and 4). Re-estimation of Table 5,
controlling for gender and risk preferences, also yields very similar treatment effects. Moreover, due to more
variability, effort in rounds 2 and 3 is not significantly correlated with gender or risk preferences. All results are
available from authors upon request.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, we use controlled laboratory environment to investigate the pattern of
outcomes and efforts in a best-of-three contest that includes both intermediate prizes and a
varying role of luck. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find that instituting
intermediate prizes increases both the individual effort and the length of the contest. Conversely,
players are unwilling to expend higher effort when luck plays a greater role in determining the
winner. Our experimental design also disentangles the behavioral explanations of various effort
choices from the strategic incentives. We observe strategic momentum in situations for which it
is predicted, and we do not observe psychological momentum.
Our experiment provides direct empirical evidence that can be instructive in the design of
optimal contests. Contest design has been a topic of extensive theoretical and empirical
investigation primarily because contest objectives vary greatly – contests can be designed to
generate highest revenue or to minimize social waste. For instance, in organization of sports
tournaments it is often desirable to induce the players to spend the maximal amount of effort, or
to induce an effort allocation that increases the chance of a close contest, with the objective of
enhancing the excitement level of the tournament. Our experimental results indicate that this is
best achieved by instituting intermediate prizes, and by making the contest more deterministic
(i.e., reduce the random extraneous factors such as luck in determining the winner). In other rent
seeking activities, such as political campaigns and patent races, the objective might be to
minimize long-drawn contests and the accompanying wasteful expenditure. We find that it is
best achieved by implementing only the grand prize (e.g., in U.S primaries, only the candidate to
win a majority of their party delegates wins the party nomination; or in a patent race, only the
first firm to finish the invention discovery process is awarded patent protection).
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To simplify the exposition we abstract from a number of issues that are nevertheless
important in the field. For instance, we assume that there are only two players, and that they are
symmetric. However, qualitative predictions of model do not change substantially when there are
more than two players (Klumpp and Polborn, 2006). Furthermore, if one player has an
exogenous advantage over the other, the ex ante advantage adds to the strategic momentum and
further increases the probability of win by the skilled player.
Finally, although the focus of this paper has been comparative statics and pattern of
effort, our results show that over-dissipation in contests is a robust phenomenon and is worthy of
further investigation. We conjecture that best-of-three contests can provide a good platform for
an explicit evaluation of some of the possible explanations for over-dissipation discussed above.
This would involve both theoretical and experimental analysis. Theoretical work may be aimed
at explaining the descriptive limitations of Nash equilibrium in these contests. For example, it
may be possible to derive an evolutionary stable equilibrium for the entire best-of-three contest.
Experimental investigation can then compare the predictions of this model to predictions based
on the various competing explanations for over-dissipation.

26

References
Alchian, A. (1950). Uncertainty, evolution and economic theory. Journal of Political Economy,
58, 211-221.
Amaldoss, W., & Rapoport, A. (2009). Excessive Expenditure in Two-Stage Contests: Theory
and Experimental Evidence. In I. N. Hangen and A. S. Nilsen (Eds.), Game Theory:
Strategies, Equilibria and Theorems , 241-266, Nova Science Publishers, NY.
Anderson, L.R., & Freeborn, B.A. (2010). Varying the intensity of competition in a multiple
prize rent seeking experiment. Public Choice, 143, 237-254.
Anderson, L.R., and Stafford, S.L. (2003). An experiment analysis of rent seeking under varying
competitive conditions. Public Choice, 115, 199-216.
Arkes, H.R., & Blumer, C. (1985). The psychology of sunk cost. Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, 35, 124–140.
Aronson, E. (1968). Dissonance Theory: Progress and Problems. In R. Abelson et al., eds,
Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook, Rand McNally and Co, 5-27.Baharad, E.,
and Nitzan, S. (2008). Contest Efforts in Light of Behavioral Considerations. Economic
Journal, 118, 2047-2059.
Baharad, E. & Nitzan, S. (2008). Contest Efforts in Light of Behavioural Considerations.
Economic Journal, 118, 2047-2059.
Baker, G., Gibbs, M., & Holmstrom, B. (1994a). The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence
from Personnel Data. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 881-919.
Baker, G., Gibbs, M., & Holmstrom, B. (1994b). The Wage Policy of a Firm. Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 109, 921-955.
Cason, T. N., Masters, W.A., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2010). Entry into Winner-Take-All and
Proportional-Prize Contests: An Experimental Study. Journal of Public Economics, 94, 604611.
Cason, T.N., Sheremeta, R.M., & Zhang, J. (2012). Communication and Efficiency in
Competitive Coordination Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 76, 26-43.
Charness, G., & Levin, D. (2009). The Origins of the Winner’s Curse: A Laboratory Study.
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 1, 207–36.
Chen, Y., Katuscak, P., & Ozdenoren, E. (2012). Why Can’t a Woman Bid More Like a Man?
Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming.
D’Avolio, G. (2002). The Market for Borrowing Stock. Journal of Financial Economics, 66,
271–306.
Davis, D., & Reilly, R. (1998). Do too many cooks spoil the stew? An experimental Analysis of
rent-seeking and the role of a strategic buyer. Public Choice, 95, 89 – 115.
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2012). A Survey of Experimental Research
on Contests, All-Pay Auctions and Tournaments. Chapman University, ESI Working Paper.
Deck, C., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2012). Fight or Flight? Defending Against Sequential Attacks in
the Game of Siege. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56, 1069-1088.
Dorsey-Palmateer, R., & Smith, G. (2004). Bowlers’ hot hands. American Statistician, 58, 38-45.
Ferrall, C., & Smith, A. (1999). A sequential game model of sports championship series: theory
and estimation. Review of Economics and Statistics, 81, 704-719.
Festinger, L. (1957). A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic experiments.
Experimental Economics, 10, 171-178.

27

Fonseca, M.A. (2009). An experimental investigation of asymmetric contests. International
Journal of Industrial Organization, 27, 582-591.
Freeman, R.B., & Gelber, A.M. (2010). Prize Structure and Information in Tournaments:
Experimental Evidence. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2, 149–64.
Friedman, D., Pommerenke, K., Lukose, R., Milam, G., & Huberman, B.A. (2010). In search for
the sunk cost fallacy. Experimental Economics,10, 79-104
Fudenberg, D., Gilbert, R., Stiglitz, J., & Tirole, J. (1983). Preemption, leapfrogging and
competition in patent races. European Economic Review, 22, 3-31.
Ham, J.C., & Kagel, J.H. (2006). Gender Effects in Private Value Auctions. Economic Letters,
92, 375-382.
Hamilton, W.D. (1970). Selfish and spiteful behavior in evolutionary model. Nature, 228, 12181220.
Hehenkamp, B., Leininger, W., & Possajenikov, A. (2004). Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock
contests: spite and overdissipation. European Journal of Political Economy, 20, 1045-1057.
Hillman, A.L. & Katz, E. (1984). Risk averse rent-seekers and the social cost of monopoly
power. Economic Journal, 94, 104-110.
Holt, C. A. and Laury, S. (2002). Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects. American Economic
Review , 92,1644-1655.
Irfanoglu, Z.B., Mago, S.D., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2013). Sequential versus Simultaneous
Election Contests: An Experimental Study. Chapman University, ESI Working Paper.
Jackson, D. (1993). Independent trials are a model for disaster. Applied Statistics, 42, 211-220.
Kerick, S.E., Iso-Ahola, S.E. & Hatfield, B.D. (2000). Psychological momentum in target
shooting: Cortical, cognitive-affective, and behavioral responses. Journal of Sport &
Exercise Psychology, 22, 1-20.
Kimbrough, E.O., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2012). Side-Payments and the Costs of Conflict.
International Journal of Industrial Organization, forthcoming.
Klumpp, T., & Polborn, M.K. (2006). Primaries and the New Hampshire effect. Journal of
Public Economics, 90, 1073-1114.
Konrad, K. A., & Schlesinger, H. (1997). Risk aversion in risk seeking and rent-augmenting
games. Economic Journal, 107, 1671-1683.
Konrad, K.A., & Kovenock, D. (2009). Multi-battle contests. Games and Economic Behavior,
66, 256-274.
Leininger, W. (2003). On evolutionarily stable behavior in contests. Economics of Governance,
4, 177-186.
Mago, S.D., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2012). Multi-battle Contests: An Experimental Study.
Chapman University, ESI Working Paper.
Mago, S.D., Savikhin, A.C., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2012). Facing Your Opponents: Social
Identification and Information Feedback in Contests. Chapman University, ESI Working
Paper.
Malueg, D., & Yates, A. (2005). Equilibria and comparative statics in two player contests.
European Journal of Political Economy, 21, 738-752.
Malueg, D., & Yates, A. (2010). Testing contest theory: evidence from best-of-three tennis
matches. Review of Economics and Statistics, 92, 689-692.
McFall, T., Knoeber, C., & Thurman, W. (2009). Contests, grand prizes, and the hot hand.
Journal of Sports Economics, 10, 236-255.

28

McKee, M. (1989). Intra-experimental income effects and risk aversion. Economic Letters, 30,
109-115.
McKelvey, R. & Palfrey, T. (1995). Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games.
Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 6-38.
Millner, E. L. & Pratt, M. (1991). Risk Aversion and Rent-Seeking: An Extension and Some
Experimental Evidence. Public Choice, 69, 81-92.
Millner, E.L. & Pratt, M.D. (1989). An Experimental Investigation of Efficient Rent-Seeking.
Public Choice, 62, 139-151.
Mosteller, F. (1952). The world series competition. Journal of the American Statistical
Association, 47, 355-380.
Nitzan, S. (1991). Collective Rent Dissipation. The Economic Journal, 101, 1522-1534.
Parco J., Rapoport A., & Amaldoss W. (2005). Two-stage Contests with Budget Constraints: An
Experimental Study. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 49, 320-338.
Potters, J., de Vries, C.G., & van Winden, F. (1998). An experimental examination of rational
rent-seeking. European Journal of Political Economy, 14, 783 – 800.
Price, C.R. & Sheremeta, R.M. (2011). Endowment Effects in Contests. Economics Letters, 111,
217-219.
Price, C.R., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2012). Endowment Origin, Demographic Effects and Individual
Preferences in Contests. Chapman University, ESI Working Paper.
Riechmann, T. (2007). An analysis of rent-seeking games with relative-payoff maximizers.
Public Choice, 133, 147-155.
Savikhin, A.C. & Sheremeta, R.M. (2012). Simultaneous Decision-Making in Competitive and
Cooperative Games. Economic Inquiry, forthcoming.
Schmitt, P., Shupp, R. Swope, K., & Cadigan, J. (2004). Multi-period rent-seeking contests with
carryover: Theory and Experimental Evidence. Economics of Governance, 10, 247-259.
Sheremeta, R.M. (2010a). Expenditures and Information Disclosure in Two-Stage Political
Contests. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54, 771-798.
Sheremeta, R.M. (2010b). Experimental Comparison of Multi-Stage and One-Stage Contests.
Games and Economic Behavior, 68, 731–747.
Sheremeta, R.M. (2011). Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation. Economic Inquiry, 49,
573–590.
Sheremeta, R.M. (2013). Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments.
Chapman University, ESI Working Paper.
Sheremeta, R.M., & Zhang, J. (2010). Can Groups Solve the Problem of Over-Bidding in
Contests? Social Choice and Welfare, 35, 175-197.
Szymanski, S. (2003). The Economic Design of Sporting Contests, Journal of Economic
Literature, 41, 1137-1187.
Treich, N. (2009). Risk-aversion and prudence in rent-seeking games. Public Choice, 1573-7101.
Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient Rent Seeking. In James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, Gordon
Tullock, (Eds.), Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. College Station, TX: Texas
A&M University Press, pp. 97-112.
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation
of Uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297-323.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases.
Science, 185, 1124–1130.

29

Vallerand, R. J., Colavecchio, P. G., & Pelletier, L. G. (1988). Psychological momentum and
performance inferences: a preliminary test of the antecedents-consequences psychological
momentum model. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 10, 92-108.
van Dijk, F., Sonnemans, J., & van Winden, F. (2001). Incentives Systems in a Real Effort
Experiment. European Economic Review, 45, 187-214.
Vriend, N.J. (2000). An illustration if the essential difference between individual and social
learning, and its consequences for computational analyses. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, 24, 1-19.
Zizzo, D.J. (2002). Racing with Uncertainty: A Patent Race Experiment. International Journal of
Industrial Organization, 20, 877–902.

30

Table 1: Experimental Design and Predictions
Treatments
Final prize, v
Intermediate prize, d
Exponent, r
Equilibrium predictions
Effort in R1
Effort in R2 by R1 winner
Effort in R2 by R1 loser
Effort in R3 by R2 winner
Effort in R3 by R2 loser
The probability of ending in R2
Expected average effort
Expected payoff

H
100
0
1

HI
100
25
1

LI
100
25
0.4

16.4
14.1
4.7
25.0
25.0
0.75
32.0
18.0

21.2
22.0
13.2
31.3
31.3
0.63
50.5
29.2

7.5
7.5
7.5
12.5
12.5
0.5
21.3
60.0

Table 2: Summary Statistics
Treatments
Final prize, v
Intermediate prize, d
Exponent, r

H
100
0
1
Equilibrium
Actual
Effort in R1
16.4
22.2 (16.3)
Effort in R2 by R1 winner
14.1
28.5 (16.8)
Effort in R2 by R1 loser
4.7
23.5 (19.1)
Effort in R3 by R2 winner
25.0
33.2 (18.2)
Effort in R3 by R2 loser
25.0
31.7 (17.2)
The probability of ending in R2
0.75
0.61 (0.49)
Expected average effort
32.0
60.8 (39.6)
Expected payoff
18.0
-10.9 (56.7)
The standard deviations are in parentheses.

HI
100
25
1
Equilibrium
Actual
21.2
27.2 (15.8)
22.0
37.0 (18.4)
13.2
28.1 (16.2)
31.3
40.6 (16.9)
31.3
38.1 (16.5)
0.63
0.58 (0.49)
50.5
76.3 (39.3)
29.2
4.0 (71.2)

LI
100
25
0.4
Equilibrium
Actual
7.5
22.3 (10.5)
7.5
24.4 (11.1)
7.5
23.3 (11.3)
12.5
25.3 (11.9)
12.5
24.3 (10.5)
0.50
0.51 (0.50)
21.3
58.2 (26.7)
60.0
22.9 (71.4)

Table 3: Panel Estimation Testing Hypotheses 1 and 2
ending in
ending in
2 rounds
2 rounds
Treatments
HI versus H
HI versus LI
HI versus H HI versus LI
Specification
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
period
45.01***
23.41***
-0.48***
-0.23
[inverse period trend]
(6.06)
(8.26)
(0.15)
(0.15)
treatment HI
15.42***
18.13***
-0.08
0.17**
[1 if treatment is HI]
(5.13)
(4.95)
(0.07)
(0.07)
constant
52.76***
53.94***
0.37***
0.08
(4.67)
(5.00)
(0.06)
(0.06)
Observations
1,440
1,440
1,440
1,440
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The standard errors are
in parentheses. All models include a random effects error structure, with the individual
subject as the random effect, to account for the multiple decisions made by the subject.
Dependent variable

total effort

total effort
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Table 4: Panel Estimation Testing Hypothesis 3
effort3effort3effort3effort3- effort3- effort3effort1
effort1
effort1
effort2
effort2
effort2
Treatment
H
HI
LI
H
HI
LI
Specification
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
period
-3.34
6.16
-6.10*
-3.53**
5.39
-6.19**
[inverse period trend]
(4.30)
(8.45)
(3.43)
(1.70)
(5.64)
(2.63)
constant
10.46***
11.28***
3.42*** 4.71*** 5.10*** 2.41***
(2.32)
(3.06)
(0.33)
(0.66)
(1.80)
(0.20)
Observations
280
302
350
280
302
350
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The standard errors are in
parentheses. All models include a random effects error structure, with the individual subject as
the random effect, to account for the multiple decisions made by the subject.
Dependent variable

Table 5: Panel Estimation Testing Hypotheses 4 and 5
Dependent variable
Treatment
Specification
period
[inverse period trend]
win1
[1 if round 1 winner]
win2
[1 if round 2 winner]
constant

effort2
H
(1)
19.61***
(2.54)
2.36**
(1.17)

effort2
HI
(2)
12.42***
(2.53)
5.51***
(1.17)

effort2
LI
(3)
6.78***
(1.42)
0.82
(0.63)

effort3
H
(4)
17.81***
(3.78)

effort3
HI
(5)
12.89***
(3.58)

effort3
LI
(6)
-1.48
(1.94)

0.82
2.52
0.86
(1.70)
(1.80)
(0.91)
21.30***
27.57***
22.21*** 28.92*** 35.80*** 24.70***
(1.73)
(1.57)
(1.35)
(2.43)
(1.99)
(1.59)
Observations
720
720
720
280
302
350
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The standard errors are in
parentheses. All models include a random effects error structure, with the individual subject as the
random effect, to account for the multiple decisions made by the subject.

Table 6: Panel Estimation for Risk and Gender
Dependent variable
Treatments
Specification
woman
[1 if woman]
safe
[number of safe choices]
period
[inverse period trend]
constant

total effort
total effort
total effort
H
HI
LI
(1)
(3)
(2)
10.77*
10.01*
-0.50
(6.48)
(5.39)
(8.09)
-2.23*
-0.44*
2.09
(1.27)
(0.26)
(1.54)
53.38***
36.65***
10.17
(2.48)
(10.39)
(7.64)
76.39***
77.54***
37.36***
(9.27)
(2.45)
(5.36)
Observations
720
720
720
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The
standard errors are in parentheses. All models include a random effects error
structure, with the individual subject as the random effect, to account for the
multiple decisions made by the subject.
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Figure 1: Total Effort over 20 Periods
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Figure 2: Effort in 3 Rounds over 20 Periods (HI Treatment)
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Figure 3: Effort in 3 Rounds over 20 Periods (H Treatment)
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Figure 4: Effort in 3 Rounds over 20 Periods (LI Treatment)
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Online Appendix: Instructions for HI Treatment
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision making. Various research agencies have
provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple. If you follow them closely and make appropriate
decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money.
The experiment will proceed in two parts. Each part contains decision problems that require you to make a
series of economic choices which determine your total earnings. The currency used in Part 1 of the experiment is
U.S. Dollars. The currency used in Part 2 of the experiment is francs. These francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars
at a rate of _25_ francs to _1_ dollar. You have already received a $20.00 participation fee (this includes your showup fee of $7.00). Your earnings from both Part 1 and Part 2 of the experiment will be incorporated into your
participation fee. At the end of today’s experiment, you will be paid in private and in cash. There are 12 participants
in today’s experiment.
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk,
laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your
cooperation.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 1
In this part of the experiment you will be asked to make a series of choices in decision problems. How
much you receive will depend partly on chance and partly on the choices you make. The decision problems are not
designed to test you. What we want to know is what choices you would make in them. The only right answer is what
you really would choose.
For each line in the table in the next page, please state whether you prefer option A or option B. Notice that
there are a total of 15 lines in the table but only one line will be randomly selected for payment. Each line is equally
likely to be selected, and you do not know which line will be selected when you make your choices. Hence you
should pay attention to the choice you make in every line. After you have completed all your choices a token will be
randomly drawn out of a bingo cage containing tokens numbered from 1 to 15. The token number determines which
line is going to be selected for payment.
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you chose option A in that line,
you will receive $1. If you chose option B in that line, you will receive either $3 or $0. To determine your earnings
in the case you chose option B there will be second random draw. A token will be randomly drawn out of the bingo
cage now containing twenty tokens numbered from 1 to 20. The token number is then compared with the numbers in
the line selected (see the table). If the token number shows up in the left column you earn $3. If the token number
shows up in the right column you earn $0.
While you have all the information in the table, we ask you that you input all your 15 decisions into the
computer. The actual earnings for this part will be determined at the end of part 2, and will be independent of part 2
earnings.
Deci
Please
Opti
Option
sion
choose
on A
B
no.
A or B
1
$3 never
$0 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
2
$3 if 1 comes out of the bingo cage
$0 if 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
3
$3 if 1 or 2
$0 if 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
4
$3 if 1,2,3
$0 if 4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
5
$3 if 1,2,3,4,
$0 if 5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
6
$3 if 1,2,3,4,5
$0 if 6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
7
$3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6
$0 if 7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
8
$3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7
$0 if 8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
9
$3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8
$0 if 9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
10
$3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9
$0 if 10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
11
$3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
$0 if 11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
12
$3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11
$0 if 12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
13
$3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12
$0 if 13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
14
$3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13
$0 if 14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
15
$3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14
$0 if 15,16,17,18,19,20
$1
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 2
YOUR DECISION
The second part of the experiment consists of 20 decision-making periods. The 12 participants in today’s
experiment will be randomly re-matched every period into 6 groups with 2 participants in each group. Therefore, the
specific person who is the other participant in your group will change randomly after each period. The group
assignment is anonymous, so you will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to your group
Each period consists of a maximum of three rounds. The period ends when one of the participants wins
two of the three rounds ("best of three"). Thus, each period will consist of either two or three rounds. In each round,
you and the other participant in your group will simultaneously make a bid (any number, including 0.1 decimal
points). Your bid in each round cannot exceed 100 francs. The more you bid, the more likely you are to win a
particular round. This will be explained in more detail later. Your earnings depend on the number of rounds you won
and how many francs you spent on bidding. An example of your decision screen is shown below in Figure 1:
Figure 1 – Decision Screen

There are two types of rewards that you may receive during each period: big reward and small reward.
The big reward is worth 100 francs and the small reward is worth 25 francs to you and the other participant in your
group. The winner of an individual round will receive the small reward, while the participant who is first to win
two rounds receives, in addition, the big reward. The period ends as soon as the big reward winner is determined.
CHANCE OF WINNING A ROUND
You can never guarantee that you will win a round. However, the greater your bid relative to the other
participant’s bid, the greater your probability of winning the round. That is, the more you bid, the more likely you
are to win a round. The more the other participant in your group bids, the less likely you are to win a round.
Specifically, your chance of winning a round is given by the following expression.
(Your Bid)
Your chance of
=
winning a round
(Your Bid) + (The Other Participant’s Bid)
Think of this in the following way. For each franc you bid you will receive lottery tickets. For example, if
you bid 10 francs and the other participant bid 20 francs, you will receive 10 lottery tickets and the other participant
will receive 20 lottery tickets. At the end of each round the computer draws randomly one ticket among all the
tickets purchased by you and the other participant in your group. The owner of the drawn ticket wins the round. In
the example above, your chance of winning the round is 0.33 = 10/(10+20) and the other participant’s chance of
winning is 0.67 = 20/(10+20). Note that your chance of winning a round is proportional to the amount of lottery
tickets purchased by you and the other participant.
In the sheet attached to these instructions, you will find a probability table. This table will give you some
idea of how your bid and the other participant’s bid affect your chance of winning. For instance, suppose you bid 50
francs and the other participant bid 30 francs then your chance of winning the round is 0.63. Note that as stated
before, your chance of winning increases as your bid increases relative to the other participant’s bid. So if you bid
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70 francs and the other participant is still bidding 30 francs, your chance of winning increases to 0.70. To assist you
with calculation of more precise numbers, we will provide you with the Excel calculator in each round. You may use
the calculator to find the chance of winning for any combination of your bid and the other participant’s bid. We will
have a few practice rounds with the Excel calculator before the start of the experiment.
YOUR EARNINGS
Your earnings depend on the number of rounds you won and how many francs you spent on bidding in
each round. For each round you win you receive a small reward. The participant who is first to win two rounds
receives, in addition, the big reward. One of the four payment scenarios is possible:
(1) If the period lasted for only two rounds
(1a) Earnings of the participant who won both rounds are =
= (big reward) + (2 × small reward) – (bid in round 1) – (bid in round 2)
= 100 + 2 × 25 – (bid in round 1) – (bid in round 2)
(1b) Earnings of the participant who won neither rounds are =
= 0 – (bid in round 1) – (bid in round 2)
(2) If the period lasted for three rounds
(2a) Earnings of the participant who won two rounds are =
= (big reward) + (2 × small reward) – (bid in round 1) – (bid in round 2) - (bid in round 3)
= 100 + 2 × 25 – (bid in round 1) – (bid in round 2) - (bid in round 3)
(2b) Earnings of the participant who won one round are =
= (1 × small reward) – (bid in round 1) – (bid in round 2) - (bid in round 3)
= 1 × 25 – (bid in round 1) – (bid in round 2) - (bid in round 3)
Please note that regardless of who wins the round, both participants will have to pay their bids.
END OF THE ROUND
After both participants make their round bids, the computer will make a random draw which will determine
the winner of the round. Both participants will observe the outcome of the round – your bid, other participant’s bid
and winner, as shown in Figure 2. Then they make bids in another round. This continues until one of the participants
in the group wins two rounds.
Figure 2 – Intermediate Screen

END OF THE PERIOD
The period ends when one of the participants in the group wins two rounds. At the end of the period, the
computer will calculate your period earnings based on the number of rounds you won and how many francs you
spent on bidding in each round. Your earnings from that period will be reported on the outcome screen as shown in
Figure 3. Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record your results for the period on your Personal
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Record Sheet under the appropriate heading. You will be randomly re-matched with a different participant at the
start of the next period.
Figure 3 – Outcome Screen

END OF THE EXPERIMENT
At the end of the experiment we will use the bingo cage to randomly select 2 out of 20 periods for actual
payment. Depending on the outcome in a given period, you may receive either positive or negative earnings. You
will sum the total earnings for these 2 periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment, as shown on the last page
of your personal record sheet. Remember you have already received a $20.00 participation fee (equivalent to 500
francs). If your earnings from this part of the experiment are positive, we will add them to your participation fee. If
your earnings are negative, we will subtract them from your participation fee.
Are there any questions?
Before we begin this part of the experiment, we request that you fill the following questionnaire. The only
purpose of the questionnaire is to check your understanding of the instructions. The experiment will start as soon as
everyone has completed the questionnaire and we have addressed any doubts or concerns. We will start with a few
practice rounds with the Excel probability calculator.
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